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Abstract
This article presents a model of development, civil war and climate change. There are multiple interactions.
Economic growth reduces the probability of civil war and the vulnerability to climate change. Climate change
increases the probability of civil war. The impacts of climate change, civil war and civil war in the neighbouring
countries reduce economic growth. The model has two potential poverty traps – one is climate-change-induced and
one is civil-war-induced – and the two poverty traps may reinforce one another. The model is calibrated to sub-
Saharan Africa and a double Monte Carlo analysis is conducted in order to account for both parameter uncertainty
and stochasticity. Although the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) is used as the baseline, thus
assuming rapid economic growth in Africa and convergence of African living standards to the rest of the world, the
impacts of civil war and climate change (ignored in SRES) are sufficiently strong to keep a number of countries in
Africa in deep poverty with a high probability.
Keywords
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Introduction
The socio-economic scenarios that underpin future
projections of climate change are very peaceful (Nakice-
novic & Swart, 2001). This is in sharp contrast to the
past, which regularly saw violent conflict between and
within states. The absence of (civil) war in future scenar-
ios of climate change is even more surprising when one
considers that violent conflict can have a profound
impact on development (Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya,
2005), and that one of the more worrying assertions is
that climate change could enhance violent conflict
(Barnett & Adger, 2007). This article seeks to fill this
void by developing a simulation model for the three-
way interaction between civil war, climate change and
development.
The model has a few, simple components: climate
change has a negative impact on the economy, slowing
down its growth. Climate change increases the probabil-
ity of civil war. Civil war has a negative impact on eco-
nomic growth. In turn, economic growth reduces the
vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, and it
reduces the probability of an outbreak of violent conflict.
Although its components are simple, when put together
the model is complex.
As far as we know, this is the first attempt to study the
three-way interaction between climate change, civil war,
and development. Essentially, we model a race.
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Economic growth reduces the risk of conflict and the
impact of climate change. But climate change and con-
flict reinforce one another and reduce economic growth.
If the first effect is stronger, countries will be rich, peace-
ful and not much bothered by climate change. If the lat-
ter effect is stronger, countries will be poor, torn by
conflict and suffer from climate change. Phrased like
this, the model is used to investigate whether there is a
conflict-and-climate-induced poverty trap – or rather,
the size of the trap and which countries are more likely
to be caught by it.
We qualitatively sketch the mechanisms above. It is
therefore possible to construct a mathematical model
from which a conflict-and-climate poverty trap emerges.
We do so below. We parameterize the model with realis-
tic values and conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis on
the parameters. This exercise takes the article from the
question ‘is it possible?’ to ‘how likely is it?’.
It would be preferable to investigate the strength of
the hypothesized conflict-and-climate poverty trap using
observations. However, rapid climate change has not
happened in the period for which there are good data
on conflict and development. We therefore rely on a
simulation model.
While there are a number of articles on the relation-
ship between conflict and economic growth and on cli-
mate change and growth, there is little quantitative
evidence on conflict and climate change – see the next
section for a literature review. Therefore, as a secondary
contribution, the article also develops and estimates a
model of the impact of climate change on civil war.
As a third contribution, we introduce a new richness
to the scenarios of development used in climate change
analysis. We apply the model to sub-Saharan Africa, the
region that is least developed and most subject to (civil)
war.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section
reviews the literature. After that, we present the model,
with additional material in the appendix. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the results. As with any numer-
ical model, the results follow from the assumptions,
which are particularly uncertain in this case. We there-
fore conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis and focus
on the qualitative results. The final section concludes.
Previous literature
Climate and conflict
Existing empirical research on the role of climate change
in violent conflict is limited and inconclusive. Homer-
Dixon (1994) examines a number of case studies, in
order to determine if environmental scarcities cause
violent conflict. Evidence from these case studies sug-
gests that while conflict has indeed occurred in areas of
resource scarcity, key contextual factors have played an
important role. For example, he argues that serious civil
unrest is unlikely to occur unless the political structure
prevents challenger groups from expressing their grie-
vances peacefully, but offers these groups an opportunity
for violence against authority. Later research (Buhaug,
2010a,b; Buhaug & Rød, 2006; Burke et al., 2009,
2010; Dixon, 2009; Gleditsch, 1998; Gleditsch et al.,
2006; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Henderson, 2000;
Henderson & Singer, 2000; Hendrix & Glaser, 2007;
Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007; Raleigh, 2010; Raleigh &
Urdal, 2007; Theisen, 2008; Urdal, 2005) finds conflict-
ing evidence about whether or not environment and cli-
mate factors contribute to violent conflict. There is a
consensus, however, that other, non-environmental fac-
tors dominate.
See also the other articles in this special issue, three of
which are particularly relevant for our contribution.
Gartzke (2012) seeks to estimate the effect of the annual
global mean temperature on interstate conflict in the last
150 years but, since he fails to account for non-
stationarity in the data (Engle & Granger, 1987), his
results are not robust. Using panel data with 30 years and
170 countries, Bergholt & Lujala (2012) find that natu-
ral disasters negatively affect economic growth, but that
this does not in turn influence the onset of civil war. In a
similar analysis, Koubi et al. (2012) find that tempera-
ture and precipitation do not affect economic growth,
but that growth does reduce the probability of armed
civil conflict.
Collier & Hoeffler (1998) were the first to suggest an
‘economic theory’ of civil conflict – rent-seeking by vio-
lence – and to test their predictions with data. Later arti-
cles have refined the hypotheses and econometrics
(Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Collier, Hoeffler &
Rohner, 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Elbadawi &
Sambanis, 2000; Justino, 2009; Schollaert & van de
Gaer, 2009; van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 2010; Welsch,
2008; Wick, 2008; Wick & Bulte, 2006). While these
articles tend to find a link between material deprivation
and conflict and between specific resources and conflict,
there is no direct link between climate and conflict.
Material deprivation has many causes and climate is at
best a contributing factor (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robin-
son, 2001, 2002; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Gallup,
Sachs & Mellinger, 1999; Masters & McMillan,
2001). According to this strand of literature, people may
fight over resources that are highly valuable and easy to
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smuggle (e.g. diamonds) but they tend not to fight over
bulky goods such as water and food – climate- and
weather-sensitive resources are, therefore, less conflict-
prone.
Below, we augment the empirical work of Collier,
Hoeffler & Rohner (2009) and find that drought does
impact the probability of civil war. This finding is obvi-
ously in contrast with some of the literature touched on
above. We therefore also show a sensitivity analysis with-
out any impact of climate change on the risk of civil war.
Conflict and growth
From an economic perspective, the consequences of con-
flict may be severely damaging. Collier (1999) investi-
gates the consequences of civil war for GDP, during
the conflict years and in the early years following. He
finds that during civil wars GDP per capita declines at
an annual rate of 2.2%, relative to its counterfactual.
This is partly explained by reduced production but is also
the result of a gradual loss of the capital stock. Capital-
intensive and transaction-intensive sectors will be
severely affected: manufacturing, construction, trans-
port, distribution and finance will all contract more rap-
idly than GDP. Collier argues that the restoration of
peace does not necessarily imply a peace dividend, or a
large bounce-back effect, as might be expected. He finds
that if a civil war lasts only one year, it causes a loss of
growth of 2.1% per annum, in the first five years of
peace. This loss of growth is not significantly different
from the loss that would have been experienced had the
war continued. If the war has been sufficiently long,
however, Collier argues that the repatriation of capital
enables the economy to grow rapidly. Empirically he
finds that after a 15-year war, the post-war growth rate
is enhanced by 5.9% per annum. Later articles find sim-
ilar effects, and also study the spillover effects on neigh-
bouring countries and trading partners (Asteriou &
Price, 2001; Azam, Fosu & Ndung’u, 2002; Bayer &
Rupert, 2004; Bozzoli, Bru¨ck & Sottsas, 2010; Butkie-
wicz & Yanikkaya, 2005; Carmignani, 2003; De Groot,
2010; Fosu, 2003; Gyimah-Brempong & Corley, 2005;
Kang & Meernik, 2005; Koubi, 2005; Murdoch &
Sandler, 2002).
Climate and growth
Climate change would affect economic growth and
development, but our understanding is limited.
Fankhauser & Tol (2005) investigate four standard
models of economic growth and three transmission
mechanisms: economic production, capital depreciation
and the labour force. They find that, in three models, the
fall in economic output is slightly larger than the direct
impact on markets – that is, the total impact is more than
twice as large as the direct impact – while the 4th model
(which emphasizes human capital accumulation) points
to indirect impacts that are 1.5 times as large as the direct
impacts. The difference is explained as follows. In the
three models, impacts crowd out consumption and
investment in physical capital, while in the fourth model
investment in human capital too is crowded out. Halle-
gatte (2005) reaches a similar conclusion. Hallegatte &
The´ry (2007) highlight that the impact of climate
change through natural hazards on economic growth can
be amplified by market imperfections and the business
cycle. Eboli, Parrado & Roson (2010) use a multi-
sector, multi-region growth model. The impact of cli-
mate change would lead to a 0.3% reduction of GDP
in 2050. Regional impacts are more pronounced, rang-
ing from –1.0% in developing countries to þ0.4% in
Australia and Canada.
Using a biophysical model of the human body’s
ability to do work, Kjellstrom et al. (2009) find that
by the end of the century, climate change may reduce
labour productivity by 11–27% in the humid (sub)-
tropics. Assuming an output elasticity of labour of
0.8, this would reduce economic output in the
affected sectors (involving heavy manual labour with-
out air conditioning) by 8–22%. Although structural
change in the economy may well reduce the depen-
dence on manual labour and air conditioning would
be an effective adaptation, even the ameliorated
impact would have a substantial, but as yet unquanti-
fied, impact on economic growth.
In a statistical analysis, Dell, Jones & Olken (2009)
find that one degree of warming would reduce income
by 1.2% in the short run, and by 0.5% in the long run.
The difference is due to adaptation. Horowitz (2009)
finds a much larger effect: a 3.8% drop in income in the
long run for one degree of warming. In a yet-
unpublished study, Dell, Jones & Olken (2008) find
that climate (change) has no effect on economic growth
in countries with an income above the global median
(USD PPP,20003,170) but a large impact on countries
below the median. If companies can fully adapt to a new
climate in 10 years time, economic growth in the 21st
century would be 0.6% slower if climate changes accord-
ing to the A2 scenario than in the case without climate
change. This is a large impact. For example, if economic
growth is 2.6% per year without climate change, and
2.0% with, then a century of climate change would
reduce income by 44%.
Devitt & Tol 131
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 2, 2013jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The above studies are about the impact of climate and
climate change on economic growth. However, some
countries (or groups of people within countries) have not
enjoyed any growth at all, living at subsistence level
much like previous generations did.
Poverty is concentrated in the tropics and subtropics.
This has led some analysts to the conclusion that a tro-
pical climate is one of the causes of poverty. Gallup,
Sachs & Mellinger (1999) emphasize the link between
climate, disease and poverty, while Masters & McMillan
(2001) focus on climate, agricultural pests and poverty.
Other studies (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001,
2002; Easterly & Levine, 2003) argue that climatic influ-
ence on development disappears if differences in human
institutions (the rule of law, education, etc.) are
accounted for. However, van der Vliert (2008) demon-
strates that climate affects human culture and thus insti-
tutions, but this venue has yet to be explored in the
economic growth literature. Bloom, Canning & Sevilla
(2003) find limited support for an impact of climate
change on past growth in a single-equilibrium model,
but strong support in a multiple-equilibrium model: hot
and wet conditions and large variability in rainfall reduce
long-term growth in poor countries (but not in hot ones)
and increase the probability of being poor.
There are two equilibria in the model of Galor &Weil
(1996). One is characterized by high population growth
and low capital intensity (the ‘Malthusian’ equilibrium),
the other by low population growth and high capital
intensity (the ‘Solowian’ equilibrium). Physical labour
plays a more important role in setting wages, output and
savings in the Malthusian equilibrium than in the Solo-
wian equilibrium. This implies that anything that affects
physical labour is more important in the Malthusian
equilibrium than in the Solowian one. And, as capital
intensity separates the two equilibria, reduced productiv-
ity of physical labour would reduce savings and capital
intensity and hence lock the economy deeper into the
poverty trap. Physical labour would be negatively
affected by an increase in morbidity and by a decrease
of crop yields (as the model implicitly assumes that phys-
ical labour is primarily used in agriculture). Skilled
labour is affected by long-term cognitive impairment,
which is associated with childhood malnutrition and dis-
ease, both of which are linked to climate. Climate may
thus help to explain the occurrence of poverty traps, and
climate change could widen poverty traps.
Bonds et al. (2010) and Strulik (2008) posit theoreti-
cal models and offer limited empirical support. Climate-
related diseases such as malaria and diarrhoea impair chil-
dren’s cognitive and physical development. This leads to
poverty in their later life so that there are limited means
to protect their own children against these diseases.
Furthermore, high infant mortality may induce parents
to have many children so that their investment in educa-
tion and health care is spread thinly. An increase in
infant and child mortality and morbidity due to climate
change would thus trap more people in poverty.
In sum, the literature on the impact of climate and cli-
mate change on economic growth and development has
yet to reach firm conclusions. There is agreement that
climate change would moderate the rate of economic
growth, by a little according to some studies and by a lot
according to other studies. There is disagreement
whether climate change would affect the nature of eco-
nomic development, with some studies suggesting that
more people may be trapped in poverty and fewer people
might enjoy exponential growth. The latter effect is
potentially more important – contrast the difference
between 0% and 1% growth, and between 1% and
2% growth – but beyond the scope of the current article.
The model
Overview
The structure of the model, depicted in Figure 1, is as
follows. There are six equations and six variables (see
Table I). The risk of civil war is higher if people are
poorer, if economic growth is slower, and if more people
are affected by drought (Equation 1). The risk of
drought is higher if people are poorer and there is less
precipitation (Equation 2). Precipitation changes with
climate (Equation 3). The number of people affected
by drought, assuming there is one, falls as people grow
richer (Equation 4). The impact of climate change gets
worse as climate change gets more severe and as people
are poorer (Equation 5). Economic growth is slower if
a there is civil war in the country or in a neighbouring
country, and if the impact of climate change is more neg-
ative (Equation 6). These equations make intuitive sense
– the specifications and parameters are discussed below.
Parameters are listed in Table II.
The qualitative behaviour of the model is as follows.
Climate change drives its economic impact and affects
the risk of civil war. Economic growth affects the impact
of climate change and is affected by it. Economic growth
affects the risk of civil war and is affected by it. This
means that there are two potential poverty traps in the
model – sluggish growth leading to civil war and further
slow growth; climate change slowing growth and enhan-
cing vulnerability to climate change – and the two pov-
erty traps may reinforce one another.
132 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 49(1)
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Equations
The risk of civil war is based on Collier, Hoeffler & Roh-
ner (2009); see Appendix 1 for more detail, particularly
on adding drought as a driver of civil war. We experi-
mented with a number of climate variables in the context
of the Collier model. Whereas a range of temperature
and precipitation variables are not significant, the num-
ber of people affected by drought is. The risk of civil war
is specified as a logistic function. It is given by
Wc;t ¼ 11þ eZc;t with Zc;t :¼ 0 þ 1;c
þ 2ln yc;t þ 3 yc;t  yc;t1yc;t1 þ 4Ac;t
ð1Þ
where
 Wc,t is the risk of civil war in country c at time t;
 c indexes countries;
 t indexes time;
 yc,t is per capita income in country c at time t;
 Ac,t is the number of people (per million inhabitants)
affected by drought in country c at time t; these para-
meters are estimated; see Appendix 1;
 a2 ¼ –0.33 (0.12), a3 ¼ –0.061 (0.030) and a4 ¼
0.0073 (0.0040) are parameters;
 a1,c is a country specific constant1; see Appendix 2;
and
 a0 is a calibration constant such that the probability
of a civil war is 6% in 2005 (when 3 out of 50 sub-
Saharan African countries were at civil war); we cali-
brate to 2005 because that is the starting point of the
simulations; note that civil war was at a historical low
in 2005: on average over the period 1960–2000,
19% of African countries were in a civil war; calibra-
tion is necessary in the Monte Carlo analysis over the
other parameters in Equation (1).
The risk of being affected by drought is determined
by both annual precipitation (the risk of drought) and
per capita income (the risk of suffering adverse impacts).
It is given by
Dc;t ¼ 11þ eZc;t with Zc;t :¼ 0 þ 1 ln yc;t þ 2Pc;t
ð2Þ
where
 Dc,t is the risk of drought in country c at time t;
 Pc,t is precipitation in country c at time t; see Appen-
dix 2; and
 b0¼ 4.0 (0.4), b1 ¼ –0.75 (0.06) and b2 ¼
–0.00025 (0.00010) are parameters; these para-
meters are estimated; see Appendix 1.
Projections of precipitation are not particularly reliable.
We therefore choose the simplest specification. Precipita-
tion follows
Pc;t ¼ c;0 þ c;1Tt ð3Þ
where
 Tt is the global mean surface air temperature (in
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial); and
 Zc,0 and Zc,1 are country-specific parameters taken
from Christensen et al. (2007); see Appendix 2 in the
replication file.
Similarly, the specification of the number of people
affected by drought is kept simple. No new variables
(and hence no new scenario uncertainties) are intro-
duced. The equation is monotonous. It is given by
Ac;t ¼ 0 þ 1 ln yc;t0

Dc;t ¼ 1
Dc;t ¼ 0 ð4Þ
where
 D*c,t is drought in country c at time t; and
 g0 ¼ 34 (16), and g1 ¼ –4.1 (2.4) are parameters;
these parameters are estimated; see Appendix 1.
For the impact of climate change, we used the simplest
functional form that can emulate the characteristics of
FUND, an integrated assessment model with a
Income per capita
Economic impact
of climate change
Number affected
by drought
Probability
of drought
Climate change
Probability
of civil war
Figure 1. Flow diagram of the model
1 The econometric model as estimated by Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner
(2009) and re-estimated by ourselves contains a number of other con-
trol variables, which are held constant during the simulations.
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particularly rich representation of the impacts of climate
change (Link & Tol, 2011; Tol, 2002a,b). Impacts and
marginal impacts increase in temperature but (relative to
economic activity) decrease in economic growth. It is
given by
Cc;t ¼ lc;0 þ l1 ln yc;t þ l2T 2t ð5Þ
where
 Cc,t is the impact of climate (in % of GDP) in coun-
try c at time t;
 Tt is the global mean surface air temperature (in
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial); and
 l1 ¼ 0.00010 (0.00001); and l2 ¼ –0.48 (0.01) are
parameters; lc,0 is a country-specific constant; see
Appendix 2; these parameters estimated as a statistical
surface of the FUND 2.8n model; see Appendix 3.
As above, we use a simple specification of economic
growth. There is an exogenous growth path, perturbed
by civil war in the own country, civil war in neigh-
bouring countries, and climate change. Growth is
given by
yc;t ¼ ð1þ gc;tÞyc;t1 ð6aÞ
gc;t ¼ kc;t ;0 þ k1W c;t1þ k2
X
j 6¼c
W j;t1 Ic;j
þ k3Cc;t1
ð6bÞ
where
 gc,t is the growth rate of country c at time t;
 W*c,t denotes civil war in country c at time t;
 I is an indicator function, 1 if countries c and j share
a border, and 0 otherwise;
 Cc,t denotes the impact of climate change in country
c at time t;
 k1 ¼ –0.022 (0.011); k2 ¼ –0.009 (0.004) and k3
¼ –0.05 (0.02) are parameters; these parameters are
calibrated; kc,t,0 is a country- and period-specific
Table II. Model parameters
Symbol Description Value Source
0 Basic risk of civil war Calibrated
1 Effect of log income on civil war 0.33 (0.12) App A
2 Effect of income growth on civil war 0.061 (0.030) App A
3 Effect of drought on civil war 0.0073 (0.0040) App A
b0 Basic risk of drought 4.0 (0.4) App A
b1 Effect of log income on drought 0.75 (0.06) App A
b2 Effect of precipitation on drought 0.00025 (0.00010) App A
c,0 Precipitation in 2005 Table B.I App B
c,1 Effect of climate change on precipitation Table B.I App B
g0 Constant number of people affected by drought 34.2 (15.6) App A
g1 Effect of log income on number of people affected by drought 4.05 (2.42) App A
lc Basic impact of climate change Table B.I App B
l1 Effect of income on impact of climate change 1.0 10
4 (0.1 104) App C
l2 Effect of temperature squared on impact of climate change 0.48 (0.01) App C
kc,t Basic income growth rate Table B.I App B
k1 Effect of own civil wars on economic growth 0.022 (0.011) Collier
k2 Effect of neighbours’ civil wars on economic growth 0.009 (0.004) Collier
k3 Effect of climate change impact on economic growth 0.05 (0.02) Collier
Table I. Model variables
Symbol Description Unit Equation
W(*) (Risk of) civil war Number of conflicts per year 1
D(*) (Risk of) drought Dummy variable 2
P Precipitation Millimetres per year 3
A Number affected by drought People per thousand inhabitants 4
C Impact of climate change Percent of gross domestic product 5
Y Per capita income Dollar per person per year 6
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constant, capturing all variables omitted from Equa-
tion (6b); see Appendix 2.
Scenarios
The baseline economic growth rate k0 is taken from the
IMAGE2.2 implementation of the IPCC SRES scenar-
ios (IMAGE Team, 2001). IMAGE2.2 distinguished
between three regions (east, south, west) in sub-
Saharan Africa. We assume that every country within a
region grows at the same rate. The SRES scenarios
(Nakicenovic & Swart, 2001) ignore the impact of
climate change on development2 – so that indeed we
should calibrate k0 rather than g to SRES.
We use the four SRES baseline scenarios. The A1 sce-
nario assumes low population growth, rapid economic
growth and rapid technological progress. A2 assumes
high population growth, slow economic growth and slow
technological progress. B1 assumes low population,
rapid economic growth and very rapid technological
progress, particularly in energy supply and use. B2
assumes moderate population growth, moderate eco-
nomic growth and moderate technological progress.
Even the ‘slow’ economic growth assumed in the A2
scenario is, in fact, fairly rapid in its historical context.
The IPCC is a UN body, and Africa has a large block
of votes.3 The SRES models rely on Solow’s (1956)
growth theory to predict unconditional convergence of
income, a theory now widely seen as unsuitable (Barro
& Sala-i-Martin, 1995) especially for Africa (Easterly,
2002). Unfortunately, there are no alternative scenarios
available and building integrated scenarios of population
growth, economic development and energy use is a
rather complicated and elaborate activity.
Simulations
We conduct a double Monte Carlo analysis. In the outer
loop, we consider parameter uncertainty. We use a Latin
Hypercube sample of size 60 for all parameters (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2). In the inner loop, we consider stochasticity,
particularly the outbreak of civil war and drought. We
use a simple sampling scheme with 2,000 runs. This
makes a total of 120,000 runs.
The Monte Carlo analysis in the outer loop is best
interpreted as a systematic sensitivity analysis around the
best guess for the model parameters. Although we pres-
ent numerical results below, the reader should focus on
the qualitative results.
Results
The model has six variables: temperature (as an indicator
of climate change), the probability of drought, the num-
ber of people affected by drought, the economic impact
of climate change, the probability of civil war, and per
capita income. We are primarily interested in the latter
three variables, and particularly the evolution of per
capita income and the possibility of a climate-change-
induced poverty trap. Nevertheless, the first three vari-
ables are needed to understand the behaviour of the
model and the results. We therefore briefly discuss these
before turning to the main findings. Figure 1 shows that,
apart from climate change, everything depends on every-
thing else. We therefore first present the results at a phe-
nomenological level (the model says . . . ) before turning
to the interpretation and meaning of the results.
There are many countries in the model, many runs in
the Monte Carlo analysis of parameter uncertainty, and
many runs in the Monte Carlo analysis of war and
drought stochasticity. That is, there are a lot of results.
We present and interpret the results mainly for the
expected values for three countries – the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), Lesotho and Gabon
– which are the countries with the lowest, median and
highest expected per capita income in 2100.
Figure 2 shows the global mean temperature over
the 21st century. It is assumed to rise from 0.8C to
3.1–3.7C above the pre-industrial (1750) level over the
course of the century. The atmospheric concentration of
carbon dioxide is highest in the A2 scenario but so are
sulphur emissions (which cause regional cooling); the
A1 scenario therefore shows the highest temperature.
The B1 scenario shows the least warming. Precipitation
is assumed to be a linear function of temperature – see
Equation (3) – and thus shows the same pattern as
temperature.
Figure 3 shows the number of people affected by
drought over the 21st century for the A1 scenario. As
‘drought’ is defined as drought that does reportable
damage – see Equation (2) – it depends also on per
capita income – see Figure 1 – and is therefore an
uncertain and stochastic variable. The number of people
affected further depends on per capita income – see
Equation (2). Figure 3 therefore displays the expected
2 IPCC assessments progress unidirectionally from greenhouse gas
emissions via climate change to the impacts of climate change. This
reflects the state-of-the-art at the time of the foundation of the IPCC,
in 1988.
3 This article is not the right place to discuss the IPCC. See Tol
(2011) and references therein.
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value of the number of people affected by drought. For
Lesotho, about five people in 1,000 suffer from drought
in 2005. This falls by a factor eight over the course of
the century. For Gabon, the drop is much steeper – a
factor 33 – and from a lower base at that: one person
in a thousand. The reverse is observed for the DR
Congo. Some 12 people in a thousand are affected by
drought in 2005; this falls at first, but then starts rising
again in the second half of the century to about ten peo-
ple in a million in 2100. There is a strong divergence
between the countries of sub-Saharan Africa with regard
to the seriousness of drought – which suggests that some
countries may be caught in a poverty trap while others
grow exponentially.
Figure 3 also shows results for the median country
(Lesotho) under the four alternative scenarios. Results are
very similar for A1 and B1, but the incidence of drought is
considerably higher under B2 and particularly A2. These
differences are primarily due to the assumed growth rate of
per capita income; the change in precipitation has little
impact.
Figure 4 shows the expected impact of climate change
over the 21st century. Impacts are expressed as the
welfare-equivalent income loss. For instance, in Lesotho,
climate change reduces the welfare equivalent to losing
over 4% of income in 2010. This rises to over 8% in
2100. For the DR Congo, the impact in 2100 would
be almost 13% of GDP. The pattern for Gabon is differ-
ent. A loss of 3% at the start of the century is turned into a
gain of the same size by the end of the century as develop-
ment has removed the main vulnerabilities to climate
change and opened new opportunities to take advantage
of climate change (e.g. through carbon dioxide fertiliza-
tion of crops). As with drought, there is a strong diver-
gence between countries – hinting at the existence of
the poverty trap for some but not all countries.
Figure 4 also shows results for Lesotho under the four
alternative scenarios. Impacts are less severe under B1
than under A1, primarily because climate change is less
pronounced under B1 (cf. Figure 2). Impacts are more
severe under B2 and worse still under A2. These differ-
ences are largely because of differences in per capita
income.
Figure 5 shows the expected probability of civil war
over the 21st century. For Lesotho, the probability of
civil war starts at 2%, increases to over 5% and then
tapers off to 3% as climate change and underdevelop-
ment are the dominant signals in the medium term but
development is the dominant signal in the long term. For
Gabon, the expected probability of civil war starts at a
low 0.4% and falls to almost zero. For the DR Congo,
the expected probability of civil war starts high (69%)
and remains high (62%). The combined impact of civil
war and climate change mean that development in the
DR Congo stagnates – and the country remains prone
to civil war as a result. As with drought and climate
change impacts, there is a strong divergence between
countries – another sign of some countries trapped in
poverty and other countries escaping.
Figure 5 also shows results for Lesotho under the four
alternative scenarios. Results are almost identical for the
A1 and B1 scenarios. However, the risk of civil war is
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Figure 2. The global mean temperature for the four scenarios
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higher under the B2 scenario and higher still under the
A2 scenario. These differences and similarities primarily
reflect differences in the assumed economic growth rate;
climate change has a minor impact.
Figure 6 shows the expected income per capita over
the 21st century. For Lesotho, income rises from
some USD 500 per person per year at the start of the
century to almost USD 13,000/p/y at the end – a 26-
fold increase. For the DR Congo, income rises too
but only 7-fold from less than USD 100/p/y to less
than USD 700/p/y. For Gabon, income rises 90-
fold from USD 4,000/p/y to USD 350,000/p/y. A
90-fold increase over a century corresponds to an
annual growth rate of 4.5%, well within the range
of historical experience. As with the previous three
indicators, there is divergence, big time. Evaluated
at the mean, the DR Congo is not quite caught in
a poverty trap, but economic growth is very slow. The
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economies of other two countries display more healthy
levels of growth.
Figure 6 also shows results for Lesotho for the four
alternative scenarios. Per capita income is roughly the
same under A1 and B1. However, it is much lower under
B2 and lower still under A2. This partly reflects the
assumptions, but the differences are enhanced by the
impacts of civil war and climate change on economic
growth.
Figure 7 shows the expected income per capita in
2100 for Lesotho (1) for the complete model, (2) for the
model with the risk of civil war set to zero, (3) for the
model with the impact of climate change set to zero,
(4) for the model with climate change set to zero, and
(5) for the model with both climate change and civil war
risk set to zero. Model 5 corresponds to the IPCC
scenario. In Model 1, climate change affects growth
through two channels: economic impact and civil war;
in Models 2 and 3 only one of these channels is opera-
tive; in Model 4, there is no impact of climate change.
In Model 4, civil war affects growth, and in Model 1 this
is enhanced by climate change.
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Civil war and the economic impact of climate
change have a similar effect (but note that the two
interact): without civil war, Lesotho would expect to
be USD 3,200/p/y richer in 2100; without the eco-
nomic impacts of climate change, per capita income
would be USD 3,300 higher. Without climate change
and civil war, income would be USD 7,600 higher.
There is therefore a negative synergy (of USD
1,100/p/y) between the economic impacts of climate
change and civil war. Without climate change (but
with the baseline risk of civil war), income would
be USD 1500 higher. Climate change thus more than
doubles (from USD 1,500 to USD 3,300) the nega-
tive economic impacts of civil war. Taken separately,
climate change and civil war have a relatively modest
impact on economic growth. Taken together, the
impact is more substantial – and indeed the sum is
greater than the parts. A conflict-and-climate poverty
trap is therefore more likely than either a climate pov-
erty or a conflict poverty trap.
Figure 8 shows the expected impact of climate change
in 2100 for Lesotho for the complete model, and for the
model with the risk of civil war set to zero. The effect of
civil war is small, raising the impact from 7.4% to 7.7%
of GDP. Figure 9 shows the expected probability of civil
war over the 21st century for the complete model, for the
model without the impact of climate change on civil war,
and for the model with the impact of climate change set
to zero. The direct impact of climate change is modest
(which follows from the regression results and indeed the
literature review) and mixed (which follows from the
opposite effects of climate change and development); cli-
mate change accentuates the pattern seen in Figure 5.
The economic impacts of climate change, through their
effect on economic growth, increase the probability of
civil war by 1% in 2100. While absolute small, this is rel-
atively large as the probability of civil war is 4% without
the economic impacts of climate and 5% with. Together,
Figures 8 and 9 confirm the synergistic nature of climate
change and civil war.
Figure 10 shows the probability density function of
per capita income in the year 2100. The distribution for
Lesotho shows clear bimodality, as indeed suggested by
the qualitative discussion of the model properties. The
primary mode is an income of around USD 14,000 per
person per year; the secondary mode is around USD
9,000/p/y. Less than 10 (out of 120,000) realizations are
greater than USD 18,000/p/y, while the model without
climate change and civil war would lift the average
income in 2100 to USD 20,000/p/y. The impact of cli-
mate change and civil war on economic growth is unam-
biguously negative – and the bimodality is clear evidence
that, if economic growth is insufficiently fast, climate
change and civil war may hold back growth further.
The probability distribution for Gabon is unimodal,
with a single peak aroundUSD 356,000/p/y. This is lower
than the scenario without climate change and civil war
(USD 425,000/p/y). Interestingly, although the economic
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impact of climate change is expected to be positive for
Gabon (cf. Figure 4), only 33 (out of 120,000) realizations
see a net acceleration of economic growth over the century.
This is because the negative impacts on growth in the early
years are more important than the positive effects in later
years. The left tail of the distribution shows that the nega-
tive economic impacts of climate change and civil war may
be substantial – in theworst case, income in 2100 is 46%of
the modal income – but the unimodality suggest that this
would not lead to a poverty trap – indeed, in theworst case,
per capita income grows by 3.8% per year.
The DR Congo’s probability distribution is unim-
odal too, with a single peak at subsistence level. With-
out climate change and civil war, the DR Congo’s
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income would be about USD 10,000/p/y in 2100 –
120 times the level in 2005. With climate change and
civil war, income never exceeds USD 4,000/p/y. The
DR Congo is firmly trapped in poverty and, if the
model is correctly parameterized, there is little hope
of escaping that trap because of climate change and
civil war.
Combining the three probability density functions,
we see that climate change and civil war have a limited
effect on the economic development of some countries
and, a devastating effect on others, and may or may not
have a substantial effect on yet other countries. There is
clear evidence that some countries are trapped in poverty
by climate change and civil war. Other countries may fall
into such a trap, while yet other countries face no such
risk. The model thus has two solutions: a poverty trap
and exponential growth.
We did not perform a sensitivity analysis on the
model parameterization. Instead, we systematically var-
ied the model parameters in a Monte Carlo analysis.
Because of space limitations, we do not report results
as a function of the values of the parameters. The model
code and results are found with our replication data, so
that readers can check such sensitivities for themselves.
Qualitatively, the sensitivities are obvious. If the impact
of climate change on civil war or the economy is smaller;
if the risk of civil war or the vulnerability to climate
change falls faster with development; or if the impact
of climate change or civil war on development is smaller
than assumed – then there is a lower risk of being
trapped in poverty.
Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we construct a model of development, civil
war and climate change. There are multiple interactions.
Economic growth reduces the probability of civil war and
the vulnerability to climate change. Climate change
increases the probability of civil war. The impacts of climate
change, civil war and civil war in the neighbouring countries
reduce economic growth. Themodel has two potential pov-
erty traps – a climate-change-induced one and a civil-war-
induced one – and the two poverty traps may reinforce one
another. We calibrate the model to sub-Saharan Africa and
conduct a doubleMonte Carlo analysis accounting for both
parameter uncertainty and stochasticity.
The parameter uncertainty is such that any particular
numerical result is unreliable. However, systematic sen-
sitivity analysis reveals the following, qualitative result.
Although we use the SRES scenarios as our baseline, and
thus assume rapid economic growth in Africa and con-
vergence of African living standards to the rest of the
world, the impact of civil war and climate change
(ignored in SRES) are sufficiently strong to keep a num-
ber of countries in Africa in deep poverty with a high
probability.
The following caveats apply. The model has simple,
aggregate representations of complex and diverse
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Figure 10. The probability density function of the per capita
income in 2100 in the best off (Gabon), worst off (DR Congo)
and median country (Lesotho)
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phenomena. For example, we do not distinguish between
civil wars of different intensities, and we treat climate
change impacts as a deadweight loss to the economy. The
model lacks a number of mechanisms that may affect our
findings. These include human and physical capital, ferti-
lity, development assistance and interstate war. That said,
the model is calibrated with realistic numbers and shows
that conflict and climate change matter for development.
This justifies repeating the analysis herewithmore complex
models.
Replication data
The data replication files are available at http://
www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. Appendices A, B and C pres-
ent additional material on the regression analyses, model
parameters and the FUNDmodel, respectively. The data
for the regression analyses (in Excel and Stata) and the
Stata do-files are in regression.zip. The model code is
in modelcode.zip, with auxiliary files in modelsupp1.zip
and modelsupp2.zip. The graphs and the data behind
the graphs are in figures.zip.
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Appendix 1: Regression results
(Collier et al. 2009) estimate a logit model of the
probability of an outbreak of civil war. We re-estimated
their model, adding variables that would be sensitive to
climate change. Specifically, we added cereal production
(total, wheat, maize, coarse grains), precipitation and the
number of people affected by drought. We also added the
number of immigrants and the stock of immigrants,
which would be affected by sea level rise, among other
things. Only the number of people affected by drought
has a significant effect on the probability of civil war.
We use a general-to-specific strategy with joint signifi-
cance tests (Hendry, 1995) to find the model specification
given in Table AI.
Table AII shows the results of a logit regression of the
occurrence of drought (according to http://www.em
dat.be/) on income and growth. Table AIII shows the
results of a regression of the number of people affected
by drought on per capita income.
CONOR DEVITT, b. 1985, MSc in Economics (Trinity
College, Dublin); research professional at the Booth School
of Business, University of Chicago.
RICHARD S J TOL, b. 1969, PhD in Economics (Vrije
Universiteit, Amsterdam); Research Professor at the
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin; Professor
of Economics of Climate Change, Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam; and Adjunct Professor of Economics at Trinity
College, Dublin.
Table AI. Regression results for the occurrence of civil war
Symbol Description Mean StDev z-stat
1 Ln(per capita income) –0.3266 0.1210 –2.70
2 Income growth –0.06095 0.02975 –2.05
0 Time since previous conflict –0.05934 0.00954 –6.22
0 Former colony of France –1.256 0.559 –2.25
0 Social fractionalization 1.752 0.723 2.42
3 Number affected by drought 0.007352 0.004015 1.83
0 Intercept 0.9811 0.8683 1.13
Pseudo R2 0.221 N 956
Table AII. Regression results for the occurrence of drought
Symbol Description Mean StDev z-stat
b1 Ln(per capita income) –0.746 0.064 –11.7
b2 Income growth –0.000248 0.000099 2.51
b0 Intercept 3.948 0.444 8.89
Pseudo R2 0.147 N 1347
Table AIII. Regression results for the number of people
affected by drought (per million inhabitants), conditional on
drought occurring
Symbol Description Mean StDev z-stat
b1 Ln(per capita income) –4.05 2.42 –1.68
b0 Intercept 34.2 15.6 2.20
R2 0.012 N 240
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